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Since the 1990s, a self-styled Indigenous movement has emerged in India that strengthens the political will and broadens the historical consciousness of many subaltern and marginal communities. Made up of national, regional, district level and grass-roots organisations, this movement seeks to empower Adivasis - a term translated as ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ - in relation to the federation of states that rule throughout India.​[1]​ The economic imperatives of globalisation, leading to the liberalisation of India’s markets, have generated immense pressures on the social and physical resources of the nation to alter the political dynamic between the states and the subordinate groups. This dynamic is creating amongst Adivasis ‘new forms of agency and subjectivity’, which are activated via counter-narratives of community identification.​[2]​ Whereas the ruling states represent the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples as ‘Others’ - beyond the pale of civilisation and requiring development projects to uplift them as ‘Scheduled Tribes’ - recent scholarship has re-evaluated Adivasi histories, questioning the collusions and collisions between colonial anthropology and postcolonial discourses of identity and development.​[3]​ Informed by the various trajectories of Subaltern historiography, itself a field that re-interpreted Adivasi insurgency in nineteenth-century India to sustain a critique of both colonial historiography and national elitism, these texts enable readers to comprehend how histories of anti-colonial resistance regain efficacy in contemporary Adivasi identifications and assertions.​[4]​    

Comprising almost 10% of India’s billion strong population and residing in every state, Adivasis have only recently represented themselves as ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’, in the international forum.​[5]​ Therefore a new global consciousness is developing amongst Adivasis that is prepared to challenge the Indian states in relation to core issues: notably rights to jal, jangal, jamin (water, forest, land), as well as to Indigenous histories, languages, educations, and more democratic forms of governance.​[6]​ It would be misleading to suggest that the globalisation of indigeneity, witnessed for example in the form of the United Nations Decade for Indigenous Peoples (1994-2004), has ushered in a wholly new political awareness amongst Adivasis.​[7]​ This is because Adivasis have participated in and led numerous struggles against colonial and postcolonial oppression in many regions of India, enabling their limited rights (as Scheduled Tribes) to be ratified and enshrined in the Constitution of India.​[8]​ Rather, a new phase of the Indigenous movement has emerged, in which the universal language of rights has been internalised (from the perspective of Adivasis) and internationalised (from the perspective of the nation-state), generating unprecedented tensions between Adivasis and the federal states.​[9]​ 

Once the domain of an ideological battle between colonialists wishing to protect ‘Aboriginals’ from national development, and Hindu nationalists pushing towards cultural homogenisation, it is Adivasi activists who are now taking charge of the idea of indigeneity, and reappraising its relevance and usefulness in an era of ongoing, or neo-, or internal-colonialism.​[10]​ In states such as Jharkhand (Koel-Karo dams), Madya Pradesh (Forest rights), Orissa (Kashipur aluminium mining), Andra Pradesh (Birla Periclase project) and Kerala (Wayanad wildlife sanctuary) etc., the coercion of the federal governments against those Adivasis protesting against the injustices of development exemplifies how Adivasis are frequently brutalised, criminalised and marginalised in the political, legal and economic discourses of the postcolonial nation.​[11]​ The new indigenist discourse enables Adivasis to contest these processes and discourses, as it provides an inter-national system for the resolution of sub-national grievances. By reworking the concept of indigeneity across federal states and between postcolonial nations, Adivasi activists disrupt the familiar dichotomies deployed in the field of development: notably ‘the global’ vs. ‘the local’, ‘the state’ vs. ‘the people’, and ‘the modern’ vs. ‘the traditional’.​[12]​ Once confining indigenous groups to an eternity of subordination as ‘traditional native communities’, these dualities have been unhinged via the new international indigenism. This movement that finds pathways of emancipation in references to: 
i) inscribed places and a politics of location, which oppose coercive governmental practices and divisive administrative boundaries,​[13]​ 
ii) modern and post-modern collectivities, which oppose colonial and communalist notions of primordial identities,​[14]​ and 
iii) subaltern pasts and memories, which sustain minority histories to oppose the silencing and misappropriation of indigenous liberation/revolution narratives.​[15]​ As such the new indigenist discourse poses epistemological challenges to social scientists, anthropologists and historians who, whilst reconsidering their own conceptual baggage, can generate new understandings of the political and cultural dynamics of Adivasi activism, to critique the social and academic inequities that mar decolonisation.​[16]​ 

Supported by the ideology of Adivasi Self Rule, Adivasi assertions gain vitality and national prominence by linking histories of anti-colonial resistance to the discourse of the international Indigenous movement, concerned with Human rights, Cultural rights, Minority rights and Gender rights.​[17]​ Assuming new forms and working in multiple trajectories, the presence of Adivasi history sustains the political consciousness of indigenous, as well as non-indigenous leftist communities throughout India and beyond.​[18]​ In India, the discourses of internationalism, sub-nationalism, regionalism and sub-regionalism, decentralisation, Panchayati Raj (village governance), Tribal Customary Law, environmentalism etc. have all been informed to a large degree by Adivasi interventions in modern political processes.​[19]​ Whilst the Constitution of India denies Adivasi claims to indigenous status amongst those classified as Scheduled Tribes, the new international indigenism actively asserts group ownership of resources and collective identities, an idea which usually retains legitimacy and authority only in areas outside the scope of the state.​[20]​ In India today, the routine abuse of land rights and cultural rights conferred to Adivasis leads to heightened claims for various forms of decentralised governance, as well as to the emergence of new forms of resistance, new dynamics of power between state and civil society, and new interpretations of subaltern pasts. 

This paper is organised into three sections, that trace some of the important conceptual, historical and representational issues that relate to Adivasi assertion. The first part, ‘Adivasis’ as ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’, summarises the key conceptual and semantic debates that have enabled Adivasis to assert themselves as indigenous internationally and nationally. The second part, Reinterpreting Adivasi History, reflects upon a statement made about anti-colonial pasts by a leading Santal politician (the term ‘Santal’ refers to the third largest of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in India) to assess how and why movements led by Adivasi freedom fighters sustain discourses of indigeneity in postcolonial India. The final part, on the Indian Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, links up the previous two sections, to assess how this prominent indigenist organisation develops the notion of Indigenous rights relating to history, in a range of representational contexts.          

‘Adivasis’ as ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’

The conceptualisation and dissemination of Adivasi identities and histories prompts a range of intellectual and political projects, notably the re-interpretation of Adivasi histories, and the re-assertion of Adivasi rights through fluid local, regional, zonal, national, and international discourses. At the outset, the meaning and history of the term ‘Adivasi’, especially when related to the ‘Indigenous Peoples’ movement, requires some careful analysis. Adivasi representatives translate the term ‘Adivasi’ as ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ in the international forums, in an attempt to allow Adivasis to engage with the discourse of indigenism on their own terms, i.e. their specific historical, cultural and political experiences of being tribal and/or indigenous.​[21]​ On account of the fact that the concept of ‘Indigenous Peoples’ is now upheld in international law, and that the global collective of ‘Indigenous Peoples’ now has a foothold in the inter-governmental development process, group identification as ‘indigenous’ is becoming an increasingly contentious issue in South Asian nations (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal).​[22]​ As outlined by R.H. Barnes the new constellation of ‘Indigenous Peoples’ challenges dominant state-centric notions of group identity: ‘[Indigenous Peoples] is a political category whose definition is in the making, and it will probably change.’​[23]​ The pertinent issues for group identification as indigenous include: 
1) the international variability of definitions of ‘Indigenous Peoples’ (a situation that provides space for further indigenous assertion),​[24]​ 
2) the open relationship between ethnic identification and claims to ‘historical priority’, leading to contests over spatial and temporal belonging (in the fallout from the colonial demarcation of cultural terrains and identities), 
3) the processes of self-determination, and related demands for resource ownership and environmental protection,
4) the negotiation of political inequity in both colonial and postcolonial eras.​[25]​   
Once voiceless/insurgent communities have regrouped to present themselves to the nation-state as minority ‘peoples’ i.e. distinct communities with advanced moral and legal claims to regional lands, national citizenship and international rights.​[26]​ These claims unravel many assumptions that have been written into many ethnographic and administrative texts, such as those describing India’s ‘tribals’, a heterogenous community (in both cultural and political terms) that encompasses mainland Adivasis, Denotified and Nomadic Tribes, ethnic minorities and in-migrating ‘tea tribals’ of Northeast India, and the first inhabitants of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.​[27]​ As noted by Crispin Bates, these ‘tribals’ are often the subjected to prejudice in mainstream national imaginary, prompting the case for a new political identification as ‘Adivasis’.​[28]​ Whereas some sociologists demand scientific proof of indigeneity and question the validity of the Adivasi claims,​[29]​ scholars who are familiar with the anti-colonial resistance movements and postcolonial identity-politics generally support the Adivasi assertions as ‘Indigenous Peoples’. Although the notion of indigeneity can only be realistically proven at the regional - as opposed to the wider national - level in India, an Adivasi/Indigenous consciousness has been generated through shared experiences of colonisation and anti-colonial resistance, and through the distinctiveness of non-Hindu societal values and political systems.​[30]​

Organisations such as the Indian Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, or Bharatiya Adivasi Sangamam, are the current flag-bearers of the Indigenous movement in India. Although the representativeness of ICITP as an Adivasi organisation has been called into question - its network covers all of India, but it is led by activists from the state of Jharkhand - its construction of a community of ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ both a) resonates in India’s federal states where the rights of Scheduled Tribes are ignored, and b) challenges the narrowness of existing definitions of ‘Indigenous Peoples’ in inter-governmental discourse, which tend to privilege the colonial encounter, over pre-colonial encounters, in the production of indigeneity.​[31]​ The translation of ‘Adivasi’ as ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ is in itself a strategic move. For indigenous discourse in South Asia, the racial binary produced in narratives of white conquest versus black native populations (inscribed in Euro-centric approaches to the Indigenous movement) is largely irrelevant. This is because it does not distinguish between the historical experiences of heterogenous populations, such as between Adivasis and non-Adivasis in India. As channelled in the ICITP discourse, for example, an ‘Adivasi’ identity refers to the multiple histories of resistance to and/or negotiation of the discourses and practices of marginalisation by the dominant groups in India, whether they be Hindu feudalists, Moghul governors, British colonials or Indian nationalists.​[32]​ In these contexts, neither the term ‘indigenous’ nor the term ‘tribal’ adequately encompasses the complexity of Adivasi subjectivity, creating a need for conceptual hybridity and pluralism. Hence the construction of ‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ as a phraseology that disrupts the global hegemony of the term ‘Indigenous Peoples’, and internationalises Adivasis in political spaces that both uphold and challenge the national apparatus of ‘Scheduled Tribes’. By working between regional, national and international discourses of identity and development, the concepts of ‘Adivasi’/‘Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ can be understood as analytical features of ‘regional modernities’. As defined by Sivaramakrishnan and Agrawal such analytics enable discourses of decolonisation and narratives of development to be conceptualised, reproduced and negotiated by both subaltern and state actors.​[33]​

The term ‘peoples’ corresponds directly to the political collectivisation of minority ethnic groups, making both the singular term ‘people’ and the less contentious term ‘populations’ redundant.​[34]​ Derived from colonial anthropological literature, and replete with elitist notions of divisions between tribal and Hindu societies, the term ‘tribal’ has been re-cast in postcolonial South Asian anthropology and is still preferred to ‘Adivasis’ in the mainstream media and development discourses.​[35]​ This is because, in its perpetuation of cultural (as opposed to political) identification, it preserves the hegemony of the culturalist imaginary of the postcolonial nation. The administrative homology of the term ‘tribal’ is Scheduled Tribe (or ‘ST’), which links 461 supposedly distinct minority ethnic groups, such as ‘the Bhils’ of western India, ‘Gonds’ of central India, ‘Santals’ and ‘Mundas’ of central-eastern India etc, on account of their shared cultural distinctiveness vis-à-vis the mainstream populations.​[36]​ The construct of ‘Scheduled Tribe’ was formalised in the tribal policies that the Congress government implemented in the years following Independence.​[37]​ These policies revolved around affirmative action for the ‘anusuchit janatai’ (STs), the protection of ‘anusuchit kshetra’ (Scheduled Area), the authority of the Tribes Advisory Council and the representativeness of the federal state Legislative Assemblies.​[38]​ The notion of ‘Scheduled Tribe’, however, privileges a spatialisation of groups in particular states or regions, and does not adequately denote indigeneity in national terms. This is because members of STs may only be considered ‘indigenous’ to particular states. If displacement and rehabilitation into a different state occurs, persons may lose their identification and rights as Scheduled Tribes. The concept of indigeneity therefore remains partial in the national Constitution, giving the non-Adivasi elites opportunity to further manipulate, abuse and negate the system of Scheduling.​[39]​ 

Premised on anthropological tropes such as locality, contiguity, and difference, the mainstream discourses of tribal provinciality and social inferiority are increasingly being superseded by Adivasi analytics of self-determination, i.e. decentralised regional autonomy, and Adivasi Self Rule.​[40]​ Elaborating new politico-cultural tenets (minority status, linguistic diversity, cultural hybridity and performativity), the mobilisation of Adivasis around the idea of self-determination aims to provide the indigenous and tribal peoples with an equitable stake in the processes of development and globalisation. Although the Scheduled Tribe construct has provided a pivotal space for Adivasi self-identification, it usually features in current Adivasi discourse as a target of criticism, as federal states fail to fulfil their civic responsibilities in relation to the Constitution. The issue of indigenous self-determination causes much angst amongst both national elites, who are not willing to ratify the updated Convention 169 issued by the International Labour Organisation in 1989 that emphasises the rights of indigenous peoples to govern themselves, and state bureaucrats who have grown accustomed to the (mis)management of the Fifth Schedule, which defines ‘Scheduled Areas’.​[41]​  

Starting life as a Hindi term derived from Sanskrit (i.e. a non-Adivasi language), the notion of ‘Adi’ (first, original) ‘Vasi’ (dwellers, inhabitants) has sustained indigenous discourse in India since the 1930s.  Taking a couple of decades since then to enter, alongside ‘tribals’ and ‘Scheduled Tribes’, into the lingua-franca of postcolonial India, it is still underused, especially considering that overtly derogatory terms are still routinely applied to those groups marginalised by the Hindu caste system, notably ‘Vanavasi’ or forest dweller. However, terms such as ‘Kaliparaj’ - black people, used in colonial-era Gujarat for example, are no longer used in public or administrative discourse.​[42]​ Whereas critics of indigenous discourse see in the term Adivasi a trace of colonial-era protectionism, and a prolonging of social prejudice in the guise of cultural differentiation,​[43]​ it would be unlikely that the term would now carry so much weight in the indigenous movement unless it resonated with the ideologies of both indigenism and anti-colonialism. Similarly the idea of it being somehow ‘imposed’ on Adivasis, either ‘from outside’ or ‘from above’,​[44]​ similarly negates the agency of those who first invented and disseminated the term, and its relevance to the hundred million people it now unites to in the postcolonial era. 

Originating in the Hindi language in the 1930s, a period of intense conceptual and practical decolonisation, the word ‘Adivasi’ can be assessed as both a translation and a negotiation of the term ‘Aboriginal’. This was a colonial category employed to delineate the conceptual boundaries between Hindus and non-Hindus and thereby undermine attempts to construct a homogenous national identity. The 1931 colonial census writers, for example, re-deployed the notion of aboriginality by emphasising ‘Aboriginal’ religions and languages as categories that could help sustain protectionist policies in areas dominated by this particular demography, such as the Chhota Nagpur region of Jharkhand.​[45]​ An ethno-centric colonial logic stated that ethnic identity for ‘Aboriginals’ would hold sway, in the midst of their increasing multilingualism and conversion to dominant religions. Thus ‘Aboriginality’, as a concept could be reinforced as an elite device to manage the shifting patterns of modernity in India. The census found that the majority of Adivasis spoke in regional languages besides their mother-tongue (such as Bengali, Hindi, Oriya) but still classed as Santali-speakers or Mundari-speakers those that belonged to Santal or Munda ethnic groups by birth.​[46]​ Likewise, the primordial logic of ‘Aboriginality’ in the 1931 census denied modernity to the categories of religion. Whereas ‘non-Aboriginals’ who had converted to Christianity or Hinduism became members of these socio-religious groupings, ‘Aboriginal’ converts remained defined as ‘Santal’ or ‘Munda’ etc.​[47]​ On account of the political capital that could be earned through the de-tribalisation of the so-called ‘Aboriginals’, majoritarian nationalists - who demanded a homogenous, primarily Hindu, national community free from colonial divisiveness - dismissed the idea of ‘Aboriginality’ as little more than a colonial construct preferring to assimilate Adivasis as ‘backward Hindus’.​[48]​ However, during this early phase of national decolonisation, Adivasis internalised the idea of being an Indian national yet different from the majority, by means of 
a) having an indigenous or pre-Hindu ancestry, 
b) belonging to societies organised through a tribal or non-hierarchical, organic and democratic constitution, and 
c) aspiring to a realisation of long-held views regarding inter-community coexistence and anti-imperialist politics.​[49]​ 

The pioneering indigenous peoples’ collectives were based in Chhotanagpur (now Jharkhand), a once mineral-rich and forested area that the colonialists administered, on account of the administrative memory of the indigenous assertions, in a different way to other divisions in former Bengal, such as Bihar and Orissa.​[50]​ Becoming politicised through the many Christian missions in the area, the leaders of the Adivasi Mahasabha (Great Council of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples) first disseminated the notion of ‘Adivasi’ as a political construct, demanding equal status in the political process and particular cultural rights.​[51]​ These demands corresponded closely to the new laws (notably the Santal Parganas Tenancy Act and the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act) that were implemented in the wake of the ‘Hul’ (revolutionary liberation movement) led by Santal Adivasis in 1855-56 and the ‘Ulgulan’ (revolutionary autonomy movement) led by Birsa Munda in 1896-1900.​[52]​ Although some commentators see a paradox in the fact that the claiming of ‘Adivasi’ rights and identities relates closely to processes that are seemingly non-Adivasi, namely colonial modernity and national modernity, it is precisely this negotiation and strategic internalisation of the key concepts of colonialism and anti-colonial nationalism - such as indigeneity, difference, and dissent - that should stimulate our critical analyses. Otherwise, Adivasi history will be marred by impossible demands for cultural and political authenticity, which belie the formation of Adivasi identities and discourses through the colonial and postcolonial eras.





In admiration of the spirit of resistance that has come to define the role of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in the history of the Republic of India, Shibu Soren claims that: ‘We fighting tribals look back to our legendary heroes - Tilka Manjhi, Sido [Murmu], Kanhu [Murmu], Birsa Munda - for inspiration. Their capacity to look beyond the then ‘present’ of things, and their dauntless spirit along with their love for the land has kept us ticking even in moments of agony and defeat.’​[55]​ Speaking as the leader of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM, Jharkhand Liberation Front), which is a prominent regional party in central/eastern India, Soren commands high respect in the new State of Jharkhand, formed in 2000 after seventy years of Adivasi assertion. Having gained political prominence in the mid-1970s when he led a mass movement to assert Adivasi land rights, Soren elaborates the revolutionary legacy of his fellow Santals, Sido Murmu and Kanhu Murmu - the leaders of the famous ‘Hul’ that was fought against the East India Company and their agents of exploitation in 1855-56.​[56]​ Soren continues to fight for mainstream recognition of Adivasi participation in India’s freedom movement, by propelling his reader/listener into a history of Adivasi claims to self-governance that is being suppressed in postcolonial India. He speaks of the ‘…then ‘present’ of things…’, a reference to the emerging colonial policies and capitalist economies that were resisted, in the late eighteenth, the mid- and late-nineteenth century, by Tilka, Sido/Kanhu and Birsa respectively.​[57]​ Brutally crushed, these anti-imperialist movements continue to inspire Adivasi assertions in contemporary India, suggesting that even with national independence, the aspirations of the rural indigenous communities have remained unfulfilled.​[58]​ Such movements have been previously interpreted as: 
a) local ethnic ‘insurrections’, in colonial historiography, 
b) proto-nationalist awakenings, in national historiography, 
c) ‘millenarian’ or religious movements, in postcolonial historiography, and 
d) examples of ‘subaltern’ consciousness, in leftist historiography.​[59]​
It may now be pertinent to respond to Adivasi reinterpretations of their pasts, to analyse how Adivasi Self Rule has assumed importance in debates about nationhood and democracy in postcolonial India. Unsurprisingly, each of these historiographic approaches foreground the ideologies of the dominant class, notably: a) ‘race’ and counter-insurgency, b) nationality and elitism, c) leadership and community identity, and d) state responses to insurgency or mass mobilisation.​[60]​ In Adivasi reinterpretations of these movements narrative closure is less conspicuous, as new meanings are recovered through collective memories and memorial practices, and as new readings of dominant narratives find their way into Adivasi political imaginaries.​[61]​ 

In the view of Shibu Soren, the historic leaders of Jharkhand shared a visionary capacity that could comprehend and act upon the interests of the marginal Adivasis and their fellow agrarian workers. During prolonged campaigns of counter-insurgency these leaders and their followers were captured, imprisoned and often executed publicly by the colonialist police. Such scenarios prompt a questioning of how these movements have retained their vitality and political viability in the midst of collective trauma, forced migration and multiple phases of subordination. The descendents of those closely associated with the movements were often forced to forget their insurgent pasts, fearing of state retribution.​[62]​ Yet each of these movements engendered shifts in colonial policy, pointing to their partial success in creating a discourse of indigenous power and mobility that could be reworked by Adivasi representatives and activists in later decades. These issues can be approached by taking on board recent methodological shifts in the fields of Indigenous Studies, Applied Anthropology and Subaltern Historiography. Linda Tuhiwai Smith, for example, has set out numerous ways to pursue an indigenous research project, incorporating the reclamation of indigenous pasts, testimonies, stories and memories.​[63]​ Many of these projects overlap with newly established ‘Southern’, post-colonial, feminist and Fourth World approaches to history that have emerged in the ‘new humanities’ over the past two decades.​[64]​ Challenging disinterested scholarship, the identity-politics that these approaches address can also generate negative responses amongst reactionary state institutions, leading to complications in the role of postcolonial academicians. Positioning herself as a researcher straddling the domains of academic inquiry and political activism, Nandini Sundar has recently detailed how an applied anthropology in India can critique the historical tendency amongst politicians and activists to essentialise group identities, whilst redressing power inequities between scholarly and civic agencies.​[65]​ In her excellent analysis of collective memory amongst Santals, Prathama Banerjee demonstrates how Adivasis who survived the colonial suppression of the ‘Hul’ kept its radical temporality alive via their own speech and songs.​[66]​ By recollecting the ‘Hul’ as an alternative future, which allowed indigenous as opposed to colonial ideologies to thrive, these Santals contested conventional ways of interpreting the past and of writing history. 

Whereas Banerjee is concerned primarily with strategies of memory in the colonial-era, the writing of Adivasi consciousness must also confront the workings of modernity in the postcolonial state, from its origins in the developmental state as espoused by the Congress Party (the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty), to the more recent states of communalism as produced by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP, Indian Peoples Party).​[67]​ In the context of the ultra-Right wing nationalism that the BJP has fostered throughout the 1990s, the very notion of a minority or ‘Adivasi’ identity (i.e. being non-Hindu or Indigenous/Tribal) has been undermined by a Hindu-centric conception of India’s population. The BJP has strengthened the nexus between state bureaucrats, nationalist politicians, multinational industrialists, and district police, which is a trend that has come to characterise the economy of India in the era of liberalised markets from the point of view of non-elite Adivasis.​[68]​ Shibu Soren’s recollection of ‘…moments of agony and defeat…’ gain a renewed relevance since they were spoken in 1991, his words becoming entangled in the political realities that define indigenous identity in India today as the BJP has gained control in many Adivasi-dominated districts.​[69]​

Shibu Soren’s glorification of Tilka, Sido, Kanhu, and Birsa, manifests what Stuart Corbridge has termed ‘ethno-regionalism’, or the building of a political agenda around ‘the ideology of tribal society’ in the postcolonial era.​[70]​ The idea of Adivasi autonomy in central-eastern India has revolved around the reorganisation of four federal states, namely Bihar, West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, to include a fifth, Jharkhand, and a sixth, Chhatisgarh. Although devolution has since occurred - Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh were both inaugurated in 2000 - only the borders of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh states were affected, with Jharkhand and Chhatisgarh emerging after their bifurcation. Much to Shibu Soren’s annoyance, and having previously widened his party’s programme to incorporate the interests of the non-indigenous workers, at the time of reckoning the glory of devolving Jharkhand fell ironically to the BJP. Although the notion of a Jharkhand state first gained popularity amongst urbanised Adivasis in the 1930s, via the work of Jaipal Singh, the Adivasi Mahasabha and the Jharkhand Party, the Congress party curtailed any moves towards Adivasi-oriented decentralisation in the 1960s by breaking intra-party concensus.​[71]​ New organisations, such as the Sido Kanhu Baisi (Committee), kept the ideology of the Jharkhand movement alive by commemorating the ‘Hul’ and by probing the elitist bias of national parties.​[72]​ The Hul Jharkhand Party (the Revolutionary Jharkhand Party, which also recalled the spirit of the Santal rebellion) and the JMM were formed in the ‘ethno-regionalist’ climate of the 1970s, again bringing the idea of Jharkhand statehood into the national mainstream, to such an extent that its implementation became a significant bargaining tool between the regionalist and nationalist parties.​[73]​ 

Located within this political genealogy, Shibu Soren’s words can be interpreted as both an assertion of Adivasi ideology and as a critique of colonial and national modernities in India. Beginning his career as a son of a murdered agrarian worker he consciously styled himself as an ‘Adivasi’ revolutionary in the 1970s during the movement to harvest forcibly the produce of expropriated Santal lands.​[74]​ He has since become known as ‘guruji’ (respected leader) amongst tribal and non-tribal constituencies in Jharkhand and is now almost as revered as Sido Murmu and Kanhu Murmu themselves. Whilst his Adivasi critics claim that in pandering to regional elites he has diluted the ideology of tribal society, he is generally perceived in the national mainstream to be the embodiment of sub-nationalist assertion. Presenting the ideologies of regionalism and indigenism to the people, like his fellow JMM parliamentarians he lives and works amidst a host of emerging and contradictory political dynamics, which lend themselves to an interpretation beyond the new boundaries of Jharkhand. Whilst the ongoing violation of Adivasi and workers rights in Jharkhand is evident for example in the routine abuse of both migrant female miners in mineral-rich urban areas and bonded labourers in rural locations, as well as the federal state’s encroachment upon Adivasi lands, the implementation of Jharkhandi statehood has not equated with Adivasi autonomy in any practical or meaningful way.​[75]​ Having appropriated the idea of Jharkhand regionalism, the agents of state nationalism have continued to ignore the cultural rights of non-elite Adivasis, a condition that is reflected in many of the federal states.​[76]​ Thus the Adivasi movement in India now assumes an inter-regional dynamic, which aims to draw together the demands of Adivasis in various states to strengthen the presence of indigenous representation in the national political forums. 

The regional demands are often closely related vis-à-vis the anti-democratic actions of federal states. These include the deliberate oversight of the rights enshrined in the Constitution pertaining to the ownership and non-transferability of Adivasi lands in locations defined since Independence as ‘Scheduled Areas’, forcible displacement of Adivasi inhabitants of villages targeted by mineral extraction corporations, criminalisation of Adivasi activists protesting against state development projects, the mismanagement of state funds earmarked for Adivasi welfare, the denial of Adivasi access to forest produce by petty officials, etc.​[77]​ These violations are supported by a global geopolitical apparatus that purports to represent national interests yet increasingly sustains a vision of modernisation that actively marginalises the commitment to the democratic process of Indigenous Peoples worldwide. Representatives of Adivasi interests in India are negotiating this situation by lobbying for Adivasi autonomy and self-determination within the general parameters of the national Constitution and via the legal and political framework of federal states. By pursing the avenue of decentralisation, the proponents of Adivasi Self Rule have much support from the Leftist bloc, as both indigenous and Marxist/Maoist ideologies also seek to dismantle the hegemony of communal parties and of inter-governmental development projects.​[78]​ Throughout the 1990s a new political culture has emerged that supports committed solidarities between non-governmental organisations, Adivasi activists and communties, regional and leftist parties, and civil rights actors. In this milieu, campaigners for Panchayati Raj (Village Councils) aim to reawaken the longstanding ideal of democratic governance in South Asia by mediating authority between the federal state and the physical and social resources of any particular area.​[79]​ Since the colonial period, some of the areas dominated by Adivasis have been administered as Scheduled Areas, under the 5th Schedule of the Constitution. As these are often rich in mineral resources, federal states have been unwilling to implement Panchayati Raj in them. A pan-regional movement led by Adivasi activists helped to usher in the Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act in 1996, commonly known as PESA, although in states such as Jharkhand, the Rightist governments are stalling the act to appropriate more Adivasi lands.​[80]​         

Indian Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples

Defining the trajectories and challenges of the new indigenism in India today, organisations such as the Indian Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ICITP) bring into close dialogue the local, regional, zonal, national and international dimensions of Adivasi discourse. The organisation is a network of one hundred and fifty affiliated Adivasi cultural organisations and political action groups, and is made effective by positioning itself 
a) in rhetorical terms, between the Adivasi people and the nation-state, 
b) in strategic terms, between the new international indigenous forums, the federal states, and the nation state and 
c) in discursive terms, between the politics of cultural activism and the shifting cultures of democracy in postcolonial India. The organisation covers India through zonal (transregional) committees: Central, South, Northwest, Northeast, Southeast, Delhi. Comprising sixty member organisations - including the Adivasi Ekta Munch (at Lohardaga), the Akhil Bharatiya Adivasi Vikas Parishad (at Gumla), the All India Santal Welfare and Cultural Society (Dumka), and the World Santal Students Confederation (Kolkata) - the Central zone has the strongest representation. The key aim of ICITP is to represent the wide-ranging political and cultural concerns of Adivasis vis-à-vis the federal states. By exposing the exploitative agendas of the states’ development actors and by pressing for indigenous autonomy in international forums, ICITP has utilised international instruments such as the International Labour Organisation, the United Nations Working Group for Indigenous Populations, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative and the Minority Rights Group.​[81]​ Implementing a development model of Adivasi self-empowerment through capacity enhancement networks, ICITP enables marginalized communities to access the legal frameworks that the federal states ignore in their efforts to disenfranchise the people.​[82]​ Whilst the discourse of indigeneity in India previously revolved around claims to regional autonomy in areas that had been historically dominated (i.e. before colonialism) by indigenous and tribal communities, nowadays the discursive and political emphasis of organisations like ICITP focuses on :
i) on self-determination in the form of Adivasi Self Rule and decentralised power,​[83]​ 
ii) solidarity between Adivasis throughout the nation, via media campaigns and civil action,​[84]​ 
iii) globalising the network of resistance, to include diasporic Adivasis, pro-Adivasi activists and Indigenous Peoples outside South Asia. Whilst these shifts are sustained by the Cultural Rights and Human Rights agenda of international bodies such as the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation, they are also driven by a radical reinterpretation of Indigenous and Tribal history in South Asia, a point which is often ignored in current anthropologies.​[85]​ 

During the recent symposium on Indigenous Education at the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Dr Ram Dayal Munda (the Chief Advisor to ICITP, and longstanding Jharkhandi activist) and Sukanti Hembrom of the Jharkhandi Organsiation for Human Rights (JOHAR) debated the tensions between History education in mainstream schools, Adivasi perception of their pasts, and the assertion of minority histories: ‘India basically having an assimilationist policy as far as its minority population is concerned is reluctant to recognize the distinctive features of Indigenous tribal history. For instance, the history books have 1857 as the beginning of the freedom movement of the country whereas in fact the history of resistance against the British in the Indigenous and tribal areas is nearly one hundred years earlier as can be ascertained by the movement of Tilka Manjhi of Jharkhand, Bengal presidency in the early 1780s. In the same manner the practice of democracy (village republic) is a gift of the Indigenous tribal peoples to India.’​[86]​ The reinterpretation of Adivasi pasts as assertions of Adivasi Self Rule can be understood as a critique of United Nations Permanent Forum that does not cover issues of Indigenous and Tribal Self Governance, preferring issues such as Health, Environment and Education. This critique is expanded and redirected towards the nation-state and federal states in India through the 8th recommendation put forward during the permanent forum on Indigenous education by ICITP: ‘States must recognize the need to carry forward oral traditions of IPs [Indigenous Peoples]/Tribal Peoples (Adivasi) to ensure that the transmission of oral knowledge is not disturbed or even distorted. The use of convergence media, audiovisual technology should be promoted for the transmission and dissemination of Oral knowledge and Oral History and its documentation for future generations.’​[87]​

The interface between a reinterpretation of Adivasi history and a critique of state educational policies can be assessed well in relation to the historical consciousness that has been generated by the legacy of the Santal ‘Hul’ of 1855-56. Although Ram Dayal Munda cited Tilka Manjhi’s movement against colonial oppression in the permanent forum, it is the ‘Hul’ - which started just two years before the 1857 wars of Independence - that is often recovered by Adivasi activists as a means to contest the dominant national narrative surrounding the freedom movement.​[88]​ Radically effecting colonial policies on ‘Aboriginals’, the ‘Hul’ is represented as a national movement, not on account of its size or scope, but because it established (temporarily) an indigenous and democratic alternative to colonial rule. The mass mobilisation of 1855-56 was led by two Adivasi brothers - Sido Murmu and Kanhu Murmu - against the British East India Company and their agents in the districts surrounding the Rajmahal Hills in what was then Bengal province. Since Adivasi activists began to reinterpret the mobilisation in the context of Jharkhandi regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s, and Subaltern scholars began to re-think the significance of this and other Adivasi movements in the 1980s, the ‘Hul’ is no longer perceived by Adivasis and leftists as a minor event the long history of India’s freedom struggle. Rather, it is interpreted as the first war for Indigenous rights, which continues to be fought along any available democratic avenues as federal States continue to oppress Adivasis in the name of national development. Sido and Kanhu’s ‘parwanas’ (orders) issued to the colonial police and landowners speak of the new rule of Santals, as assumed on June 30th 1855.​[89]​ As an elected Manjhi (headman), Sido received divine sanction to form a Santal-led governing body that united the subaltern workers and all Adivasis against the colonial state and regional elites. The memorial practices that commemorate this revolutionary movement also enshrine this notion of indigenous autonomy, i.e. Adivasi Self Rule, and speak in present and future tenses (like Banerjee’s archival voices), to suggest that the anti-colonial past and the globalised present interpenetrate in ways that resist conventional representation. ​[90]​       

In the year 2005, the 150th anniversary of the ‘Hul’, ICITP’s critiques of the United Nations Permanent Forum and of the states’ educational policies in India gain a special significance. To commemorate the anniversary, a year-long project has been set up to re-assess the significance of Adivasi history in political and academic arenas. Convened by Dominic Mardi (the Secretary General of ICITP), and Daniel Rycroft (Research Fellow at the University of Sussex), Santal Hul 150: An International Forum Recognising the 150th Anniversary of the Santal Rebellion, in 2005 aims to engage widespread interest in the ongoing legacy of the ‘Hul’ amongst international researchers, Adivasi networks and minority rights activists.​[91]​ As part of this forum international conferences have already been hosted on ‘Jharkhand Today’ by Peter Andersen at the University of Copenhagen, on ‘Reinterpreting Adivasi (Indigenous Peoples) Movements in South Asia’ by Daniel Rycroft at the University of Sussex and on ‘Hul to Separate State: 150 Years of Peoples Movements in Jharkhand’ by Sanjay Bosu Mullik of the Bindrai Institute for Research Study and Action (BIRSA, Ranchi).​[92]​ Other related conferences were held in November 2005 at Visva Bharati University Santiniketan), Jadavpur University (Kolkata) and the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Kolkata). Numerous other educational events are being organised in district centres by the National and Zonal Coordination Committees of Santal Hul 150 Forum, each providing delegates with an excellent opportunity to share ideas, and publish material in Adivasi languages.  

The 150th anniversary was celebrated at Bhognadih village, the home of Sido Murmu and Kanhu Murmu, on June 30th 2005, with the largest mela held there ever since the Sido Kanhu Baisi organised events to remember the ‘Hul’ collectively in the late 1960s. The 2005 event received excellent coverage in the radical newspaper Prabhat Khabar, which produced two supplements of articles that located the legacy of the ‘Hul’ within the contemporary histories of Jharkhand and of South Asia. In the absence due to rain both of Arjun Munda, the BJP chief minister of Jharkhand, and Shibu Soren, his JMM rival, most media attention was drawn towards participants of a march organised by the Gota Bharot Sido Kanhu Hul Baisi (All-India Sido Kanhu Revolution Committee), that departed from Dumka (the district centre of the Santal Parganas) on 26th June and arrived at Bhognadih on 30th June. This unique rally brought Santals now living (as descendents of diasporic worker communties) in Nepal, Assam, Bangladesh, and West Bengal together with their Jharkhandi comrades, to forge a real sense of international and inter-regional solidarity amongst Santal Adivasis. 

As part of its commitment to establish new understandings of Adivasi history and a heightened Indigenous media presence, ICITP in association with the University of Sussex has produced two documentary films on the Santal ‘Hul’. In discursive terms, these films are situated between the pro-Indigenous Human rights documentary genre (exemplified by the directors Meghnath, Sriprakash etc.), and the Jharkhandi Adivasi activist paradigm of self-determination. Co-directed by Daniel Rycroft and Joy Raj Tudu (National Coordinator of ICITP), ‘Hul Sengel: The Spirit of the Santal Revolution’ documents how the movement’s legacy informs the collective memory of Santals in the Santal Parganas, a district that was formed as a colonial response to the political dynamic of the ‘Hul’ (and that has recently been dismantled by the BJP government in an effort to weaken the Adivasi consciousness). By incorporating rare interviews between ICITP coordinators and the descendents of Sido and Kanhu, the film emphasises the dialogic aspects of the Adivasi movement to represent agency/authority, voice/presence, and silence/absence in shifting and multiple locations. Bitiya Hembram a fifth-generation descendent of Chunu Murmu reveals how her own mother-in-law was not able to tell her about the movement, because her grandmother-in-law was too afraid to discuss the past with her. Suggestive of the milieu of cultural violence that colonialist and nationalist governments sustained in the region some seventy or eighty years after the suppression of the movement, Bitiya Hembram’s almost silent voicing of history gains support from other members of the family, notably Rup Chand Murmu, whose dynamic assertion of the legacy of the ‘Hul’ in the context of present-day Jharkhandi identities signals an engagement with more politicised and collectivised epistemologies (such as those developed via the Sido Kanhu Baisi and the JMM, and now re-presented by ICITP et al). 





Beyond the new global instruments of indigenous empowerment, the existing Constitution of the Republic of India contains important articles that support Indigenous and Tribal rights, yet that in practice are superseded by the everyday domination of petty officials, police and state-sponsored development projects. Despite the historical dynamic of indigenous resistance being written into the Constitution, in the form of special rights for Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, the murkiness of the political waters of the newly devolved states often suppress the indigenous spirit that inspired the movements for regional autonomy. The administrative term ‘Scheduled Tribe’, which is now contested by Adivasi activists as inadequately conveying the notion of indigeneity, was issued in the pre-Independence phase to support the integrationist interests of a paternalistic state. Similarly the notion of a ‘Scheduled Area’, in which tribal land cannot be commodified, although responding to changes in colonial policy following the Santal revolution of 1855-56, contains too much scope for state encroachment in the view of indigenous activists. As proved by the movement for Adivasi autonomy in Jharkhand (‘forest-country’, eastern India), statehood in itself means nothing unless the ethics of the government relate more closely to Adivasi interests.      
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